SHAHID KARIM, JUSTICE:-

This judgment will decide a cluster of Intra Court Appeals (Appendix-I) brought by the Income Tax Department / Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) and (Appendix-II) brought by the private parties to challenge the judgment passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P No.52559 of 2022 and a large number of connected constitutional petitions which were decided by the same judgment (The Impugned Judgment). At the centre of controversy is the provisions of Section 7E in Chapter II (Section 7E) with the caption ‘charge of tax’ in the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (The 2001 Ordinance) which was inserted by the Finance Act, 2022. The petitioners before the learned Single Judge (respondents in these ICAs) contended that section 7E is ultra vires the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 (The Constitution) and beyond the powers of the National Assembly to promulgate as an impost of tax. In conclusion, the learned Single Judge held that:

27. For what has been discussed, it is held that;

i. To treat the market value of immovable property as income under Entry 47 is beyond the competence of Federal Legislator, hence is declared ultra vires.

ii. The provisions of Section 7E are read down to save the taxation on Capital Value of Assets, which is within competence of Federal Legislature under Entry 50.

iii. The Entry 50 for taxing Capital Value of Assets requires that the assets should be valued as a whole and taxed inseparably. Curative legislation is expected to bring the provisions, of Section 7E, within the spirit of taxing Capital Value of Assets, and to harmonies it with other provisions of the Ordinance of 2001.

iv. Exclusion of persons under clauses (i), (iii) and (iv) of Section 7E(2)(d), is discriminatory, offending the Article 25, therefore, are declared ultra vires.

However, the legislature is expected to remove the pointed out expropriatory and confiscatory aspects in the provisions of Section 7E.

The petitions are allowed to the extent and in the manner, noted in this judgment.

2. The conclusion set out above makes it clear that the learned Single Judge held that treating the market value of immovable property as income under Entry 47 of Fourth Schedule of the Federal Legislative List of the Constitution (Entry 47) was beyond the competence of the Parliament and proceeded to declare it unconstitutional on that basis. Further, Section 7E was read down to save the levy as a Capital Value Tax (CVT) which was held to be within the competence of the Federal Legislature under Entry 50 of the Federal Legislative List of the Constitution (Entry 50). Finally, the learned Single Judge expressed his “expectation” that the provisions of Section 7E would be amended by bringing about “curative legislation” in order to harmonize Section 7E “with other provisions of the Ordinance of 2001”. This was directed on the notion that Entry 50 for the purpose of taxing capital value of assets requires that the “assets should be valued as a whole and taxed inseparably”. The relief granted went on to hold that the exclusions contained in 7E (2) (d)(i), (iii) and (iv) were discriminatory and offended Article 25 of the Constitution. On that basis these provisions were also declared unconstitutional.

3. The respondents who were the petitioners before the learned Single Judge have chosen not to challenge the Impugned Judgment. Our analysis of the Judgment is that it does not strike down Section 7E and in terms of the conclusion set out above at paragraph 27(ii), the provisions of Section 7E were merely read down to save the taxation on capital value of assets which was held to be within the competence of Federal Legislature under Entry 50. In the same vein, the learned Single Judge did not deem it proper to consider the tax to be within the field of Entry 47 as in the opinion of the learned Single Judge it was merely a tax on the market value of immovable property which could not be treated as income. In sum, the learned Single Judge considered the tax to be one covered by Entry 50 as a tax on the capital value of assets but merely required an amendment to bring the entire set of capital assets within the ambit of the law. If we were to view the conclusion drawn by the learned Single Judge holistically, the result reached was that the provisions of Section 7E were saved as also the tax which was imposed thereby.

Counsel’s submissions:

4. Learned counsel for the appellants, however, submitted that notwithstanding the conclusion set out above, the learned Single Judge took an erroneous view of Entry 47 as a field of legislative competence. According to the arguments in this Court, tax under Section 7E is squarely covered under Entry 47 and to transpose the tax to Entry 50 by the learned Single Judge was clearly erroneous. The Appellants discountenanced the construction put on Section 7E and asserted that despite a clear holding by the superior courts, the learned Single Judge while ignoring those precedents went on to hold that tax on deemed income was unconstitutional. Finally, it was stated that the Sindh High Court had upheld the provisions of Section 7E and the challenges made in Sindh to Section 7E were dismissed.

5. Mr. Shahryar Kasuri, Advocate one of the counsels for the respondents contended that Section 7E was not covered by Entry 50 as the Federal Legislature could not impose CVT on immovable property. Secondly, that the assets which had been acquired and on which income tax had already been paid were exempt from payment of tax subsequently. Thirdly, the plea of double taxation was also taken and in this regard it was argued that Section 7E would be tantamount to exproprietary taxation. The learned counsels for respondents addressed more or less the same arguments while Mr. Shahbaz Butt, Advocate additionally argued that the tax was akin to one paid under Section 37 of the 2001 Ordinance which was capital gain tax and therefore according to him Section 7E suffered from the vice of double taxation.

6. Mr. Nasar Ahmad, learned Addl. Attorney General made submissions on behalf of the Federal Government and while supporting the appeals contended that a number of taxes on income could be levied and the Legislature was not constrained in any way to do so. He also alluded to the purpose of Section 7E which was not only to generate revenues but also to discourage a certain set of behaviour on the part of taxpayers. The Appellants and the learned Addl. Attorney General placed entire reliance upon a case decided by the Supreme Court of Pakistan and reported as Elahi Cotton Mills v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1997 SC 582) to which we shall advert during the course of our opinion.

Taxation and its Attributes:

7. It has been said by Martin Loughlin in ‘Idea of Public Law’ (Oxford OUP, 2003) that tax law is a practice of public law and is therefore a constitutive of the State. It shapes the distribution of goods in society by allocating tax burden and tax transfers in furtherance of political decisions (John Snape in a book titled ‘Legal Interpretation of Tax Law (2nd Edition)). We may emphasize the political nature of tax law as embodying reasons of state. It has famously been said by Rowlatt J. in Cape Brandy Syndicate v IRC (1921) 12 TC 358 that “there is no equity about a tax”. It was said in Lehnhausen v lake Shore Auto Parts Co. 410 U.S 356, 364 (1973) by the US Supreme Court that a ‘tax is presumed to be constitutional and the burden is on the one attacking legislative arrangement to negative every conceivable basis which might support it”. In ‘Treatise on the Law of Taxation” by Thomas M. Cooley (relied upon by the learned Addl. Attorney General and a masterpiece on the law of taxation), the taxing power has been stated to be an incident to sovereignty. The concept has been articulated in the following words:

“The taxing power an incident to sovereignty. The power of taxation is an incident of sovereignty, and is possessed by the government without being expressly conferred by the people. It is a legislative power; and when the people, by their constitutions, create a department of government upon which they confer the power to make laws, the power of taxation is conferred as part of the more general power. Even a wrongful government, if it be for the time being a government de facto, maintaining its authority and enforcing obedience to its laws, may exercise the power of taxation, and the power, so far as it has been completely enforced, must be recognized as lawful. But the overthrow of the de facto government defeats the power; and the rightful government will not thereafter aid in enforcing the uncollected levies.

Every thing to which the legislative power extends may be the subject of taxation, whether it be person or property, or possession, franchise or privilege, or occupation or right. Nothing but express constitutional limitation upon legislative authority can exclude anything to which the authority extends from the grasp of the taxing power, if the legislature in its discretion shall at any time select it for revenue purposes. And not only is the power unlimited in its reach as to subjects, but in its very nature it acknowledges no limits, and may be carried to any extent which the government may find expedient. It may therefore be employed again and again upon the same subjects, even to the extent of exhaustion and destruction, and may thus become in its exercise a power to destroy. If the power be threatened with abuse, security must be found in the responsibility of the legislature which imposes the tax to the constituency who are to pay it. The judiciary can afford no redress against oppressive taxation, so long as the legislature in imposing it, shall keep within the limits of legislative authority and violate no express provision of the constitution. The necessity for imposing it addresses itself to the legislative discretion and it is or may be an urgent necessity which will admit of no property or other conflicting right in the citizen while its remains unsatisfied.”

From the portion of the 'Treatise ’ set out above, it is clear that the power of taxation is unlimited in its reach as to subject and by its very nature it acknowledges no limits and may be carried to any extent which the government may find expedient. The judiciary can afford no redress against taxation so long as the legislature in imposing it keeps within the limits of legislative authority and violate no express provisions of the constitution. The ‘Treatise’ by Cooley relied upon hereinabove is a seminal study of taxation and is considered as an authority on the subject of taxes and their nature and kinds.

8. In the context of the true construction of the word ‘income’ as used in the Constitution and 2001 Ordinance, we may refer to the observations made by a prominent US Supreme Court Judge Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes who stated in 254 US 418 with regard to the meaning to be ascribed to a word that “a word is not crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may vary in colour and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used”.

9. This is true basis on which we have proceeded to consider the extent and meaning of the word ‘income’ as used in the Constitution and the law and have arrived at the conclusion by recognizing that the word ‘income’ has taken colour and content according to the circumstances and the times in which it has been used in the 2001 Ordinance.

10. The sixteenth amendment to the US Constitution grants power on the Congress to impose taxes. It provides that “the Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States and without regard to any census or enumeration.”

11. The courts in the U.S have had the occasion to well upon the power of the Congress to lay and collect taxes on incomes and the question regarding true import of what constitutes income have also arisen in various cases. We may refer to some of the statements in ‘Words and Phrases Permanent Edition Volume 20B’, which on the basis of the decisions of the courts referred to the interpretation of the word ‘income’ by the courts in the US. The distilled essence of the decisions and the conclusions drawn by courts on the term ‘income’ has been stated in the ‘Treatise’ in the following terms:

“U.S 1947. “Income” within Sixteenth Amendment is not limited to direct receipt of cash. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 16. Crane v. C.I.R., 67 S.Ct. 1047, 331 U.S 1, 91 L.Ed. 1301. Int Rev 3110

C.C.A.2 1946. Income which is subject to a man’s unfettered command, and which he is free to enjoy at his own option, may be taxed to him as his “income” whether he sees fit to enjoy it or not. Hedrick V. C.I.R., 154 F.2d 90, certiorari denied 67 S.Ct. 53, 329 U.S 719, 91 L.Ed.623. Int Rev 3110

The term “income” as used in the Sixteenth Amendment and in the revenue statutes is not limited to cash income. "

12. “In all interpretations, our starting point of course is the language of the statute itself”. (464 U.S 206, 214 [1984]). Judge Learned Hand’s statement remains a classic invocation of the interpretive approach of purposivim. The judge said “it is one of the surest indexes of a mature and developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the dictionary; but to remember that statutes always have some purpose or object to accomplish, whose sympathetic and imaginative discovery is the surest guide to their meaning". Cabell v Markham 148 F.2 d 737, 739.

13. The chargeability to tax of deemed income is a universally accepted notion. The subject, in the context of United Kingdom, is discussed in Halsbury’s Laws of England (Fourth Edition) (23) in the following words:

“54. Deemed income. For the purpose of preventing the avoidance of tax by such devices as settlements on infant children, gratuitous covenants to pay income to others, and the transfer of assets abroad, the Income Tax Acts contain provisions which deem for the purpose of those Acts income arising under such transactions to be that of someone other than the person to whom under the general law it would belong. In the absence of specific statutory authority income once deemed to be that of someone else cannot be further deemed to be that of yet another person.”

14. The subject of statutory definitions has been at the forefront of our thoughts throughout the opinion. “Statutory definitions are a common feature in legislation and are typically used for one or more purposes... to enlarge or narrow the natural meaning of a term”. (Bennion, Bailey and Norbury on Statutory Interpretation, Eighth Edition). Bennion further refers to the kinds of definition as Inclusive and Exclusive definitions. The term Inclusive definition has been stated to mean:

(1) “An inclusive definition modifies the natural meaning of the defined term by enlarging it or clarifying potential doubt about what is covered. This kind of definition typically takes the form ‘X includes’.

An inclusive definition is used to enlarge the meaning of the defined term to cover things that are not or might not otherwise be caught. It ‘does not normally affect the width of the term being enlarged’. The term as used in the Act has its natural meaning (which is left undefined) and in addition has the special meaning given to it by the inclusive definition.

15. The term ‘income’ as defined in the 2001 Ordinance, is a case of inclusive definition and is used to modify the natural meaning of ‘income’. The definition has enlarged the meaning of the term to cover things that are not or might not otherwise be caught. This is where a link may be established with an expanding field of fiscal sociology around the globe to emphasise that the terminology applies broadly to the role of taxation in social change. In the contemporary constitutions of modern developed states, the institutional focus on the Economic and Political Constitution resonates strongly with the study of questions of tax law. Scholars are influenced by the idea that a constitution is made up of a series of political decisions as to the basic structure of economic life. (For a fuller discussion, see Tax Law, State-Building and the Constitution by Dominic de Cogan).

16. In the words of John McEldowney, (The Changing Constitution, 8th edn. (Oxford, 2015):

Political and economic pressures for the reduction of the budget deficit continue to require major cuts in public expenditure. This has had simultaneous effects on the delivery of many public services across most sectors of the economy. The financial crisis and political influences dominate the technical rules of financial reporting and control, with significant constitutional ramifications...

17. Applying the purposive approach to the interpretation of Section 7E, we have no doubt that the purpose that the provision was enacted to accomplish, was to treat as income chargeable to tax, an amount equal to five percent of the fair market value of capital assets, which the taxpayers use for increase in wealth on account of rise in value of the immovable property. The purpose is also clear from the speech of the Finance Minister and the accomplishment of the object of section 7E cannot be frustrated by holding that the legislature does not have power to tax deemed income.

Statutory and Constitutional framework:

18. Section 7E of the 2001 Ordinance provides that:

“7E. Tax on deemed income.- (1) For tax year 2022 and onwards, a tax shall be imposed at the rates specified in Division VIIIC of Part-I of the First Schedule on the income specified in this section.

(2) A resident person shall be treated to have derived, as income chargeable to tax under this section, an amount equal to five percent of the fair market value of capital assets situated in Pakistan held on the last day of tax year excluding the following, namely:-

(a) one capital asset owned by the resident person;

(b) self-owned business premises from where the business is carried out by the persons appearing on the active taxpayers’ list at any time during the year;

(c) self-owned agriculture land where agriculture activity is carried out by person excluding farmhouse and land annexed thereto;

(d) capital asset allotted to -

(i) a Shaheed or dependents of a shaheed belonging to Pakistan Armed Forces;

(ii) a person or dependents of the person who dies while in the service of Pakistan armed forces or Federal or provincial government;

(iii) a war wounded person while in service of Pakistan armed forces or Federal or provincial government; and

(iv) an ex-serviceman and serving personal of armed forces or ex-employees or serving personnel of Federal and provincial governments, being original allottees of the capital asset duly certified by the allotment authority;

(e) any property from which income is chargeable to tax under the Ordinance and tax leviable is paid thereon;

(f) capital asset in the first tax year of acquisition where tax under section 236K has been paid;

(g) where the fair market value of the capital assets in aggregate excluding the capital assets mentioned in clauses (a), (b), (c), (d), (e) and (f) does not exceed Rupees twenty-five million;

(h) capital assets owned by a provincial government or a local government; or (i) capital assets owned by a local authority, a development authority, builders and developers for land development and construction, subject to the condition that such persons are registered with Directorate General of Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions.

Provided that the exclusions mentioned at clauses (a), (e), f) and (g) of this sub-section shall not apply in case of a person not appearing in the active taxpayers’ list, other than persons covered in rule 2 of the Tenth Schedule.]

(3) The Federal Government may include or exclude any person or property for the purpose of this section.

(4) In this section-

(a) “capital asset” means property of any kind held by a person, whether or not connected with a business, but does not include -

(i) any stock-in-trade, consumable stores or raw materials held for the purpose of business;

(ii) any shares, stocks or securities;

(iii) any property with respect to which the person is entitled to a depreciation deduction under section 22 or amortization deduction under section 24; or

(iv) any movable asset not mentioned in clauses (i), (ii) or (iii);

(b) “farmhouse” means a house constructed on a total minimum area of2000 square yards with a minimum covered area of 5000 square feet used as a single dwelling unit with or without an annex:

Provided that where there are more than one dwelling units in a compound and the average area of the compound is more than 2000 square yards for a dwelling unit, each one of such dwelling units shall be treated as a separate farmhouse.

19. It would be relevant to set out the definition of the term ‘income’ in the 2001 Ordinance which provides that:

“2(29) “income” includes any amount chargeable to tax under this Ordinance, any amount subject to collection or deduction of tax under section 148, 150, 152(1), 153, 154, 156, 156A, 233, sub-section (5) of section 234, section 236Z and any amount treated as income under any provision of this Ordinance] and any loss of income.

20. The two entries in the Fourth Schedule to the Constitution at the heart of the arguments in this Court are Entry 47 and Entry 50, which provide that:

“Entry 47: Taxes on income other than agricultural income.

Entry 50: Taxes on the capital value of the assets, not including taxes on immovable property.”

Section 7E:

21. Section 7E would require unpacking as this would lend actuality to the analysis. Upon its reading, the first impression that comes out starkly is the essence of the tax given in subsection (1) to impose “a tax... on the income specified in this section. ” This is bolstered by sub-section (2) which further articulates the intention of legislature to assume that a resident person derives an income chargeable to tax on capital assets situated in Pakistan held on the last day of the tax year. That income shall be treated to have been derived and will be taxed accordingly. Having defined the incidence of tax, the measure of tax is given as an “amount equal to five percent of the fair market value of capital assets.”

22. But the incidence of tax, in essence, falls on the presumptive income of a resident person which he shall be deemed to derive from capital assets held by him. Thus the legislature presumes that a capital asset in the hands of a resident person, in the ordinary course is likely to yield certain income chargeable to tax. There is no doubt in our estimation that the tax is on income (though deemed) in contradistinction to tax on capital value of an asset covered by Entry 50. The two taxes are distinct and cannot be muddled inter se. The attempt on the part of the learned Single Judge to save section 7E by treating of it under Entry 50 has no legal legs to stand upon. The concept of an income out of a capital asset has to be contrasted with the capital value of an asset. The definition of “capital asset” considered objectively leaves it in no manner of doubt that the tax ensnares immovable property of a resident person (barring certain exceptions enumerated therein) and no other capital assets. The budget speech made it evident that the Government of the day had reasonable grounds to believe that a substantial amount of investment was parked in real estate with potential for exponential growth in value. Section 7E is simply an attempt to treat the increment in value of a capital asset as income and the resident person cannot be left immersed in the thought of deriving double benefit viz. one, increase in value of his capital asset and, two, zero tax. In case he disposes of his capital asset, no tax is leviable under Section 7E. But beyond six years, the resident person does not pay capital gain tax on such sale, too.

23. The tax has been levied on notional income but not a notional asset (from which it is deemed to arise). The legislature has intended to tax an asset apparently lying dormant and not generating an income in cash but indeed capable of increment in value. It is that value addition that section 7E seeks to tax. Notionally the augmentation in value does become part of taxpayer’s income.

Taxing Land and Benefit from Land.

24. “Land" observed Anthony Trollope “is about the only thing that can’t fly away"". When income tax was first introduced it was called a tax on property, profits and income. This was because the original rules did not tax income from property (or land) but imposed annual charges based on the value of land. For most part of long and tangled history, tax on property was by reference to value not income.

(For this statement we are indebted to Davies: Principals of Tax Laws, Geoffery Morse and Sandra Eden, Ninth Edition)

25. Section 7E in our opinion is a species of taxing income from property business (not from property as such) and more appropriately labelled as property income. We may pause here to emphasis a concept which ought to be borne in mind. What these provisions tax is the benefit that arises from exploiting a legal interest in land not the land itself. (See Lowe v Ashmore [1971]1 AllER 1057.)

26. Further, income tax charge is on income and not capital receipts. The essence of the distinction between capital (a stock) and income (a flow) is of utmost importance. Capital receipts are caught by Capital Gains Tax enacted by Section 37 of 2001 Ordinance. In ordinary parlance, although capital gain is not income per se, yet it has been treated as taxable income in 2001 Ordinance. This is an illustration of treating as income a sum which would not be income on a conceptual plane.

In many jurisdictions, property income is now charged under provisions similar to those for trading income. In the case of section 7E as well, the legislature is convinced that persons holding properties in excess of a certain threshold are, in actual fact, trading in properties and must be taxed accordingly. In short, income tax is also imposed on receipts that are not income tax receipts but rather capital receipts. If such can be treated as income for purposes of income tax, then, by same analogy, deemed income can also be subjected to charge of income tax, by treating it as income. In other words this is taxing potential earning and would be considered imputed income from actual return on investment in the form of use rather than money.

27. In the Fourth Schedule, Entries 43 to 54 deal with fields of legislation for taxation purposes for the Parliament. As explicated, we are here concerned with Entries 47 and 50 which have been reproduced above. Entry 47 relates to taxes on income other than agricultural income. The words used in Entry 47 are broad based and open-ended. We will bear in the mind the oft-quoted and settled principles regarding entries in the Fourth Schedule to reiterate that these entries are not the actual source of power to vest in the Parliament. That power is derived from the substantive provisions in the Constitution. They are merely fields of legislation and these fields cannot be read restrictively so as to constrict the powers of the Parliament to pass legislation. The term ‘income’ has not been defined in the Constitution and would take colour from its ordinary meaning or as a term of art which has acquired a definition historically and by the precedents of the superior courts. The simple proposition in our opinion is that if the term ‘income’ has not been defined in a certain manner by the Constitution, it must be given its widest and broadest meaning and the amplitude of the term cannot be confined to mean a certain thing and not the other. It would then be left to the legislature to define the term ‘income’ which has been done by providing a definition in the 2001 Ordinance as set out above.

28. The definition of ‘income’ given in the 2001 Ordinance does not restrict the meaning of the term ‘income’ but uses the word ‘includes’ which would leave it open for a specific sum to be included in the term ‘income’ as the case may require. By the Finance Act, 2003 the words “any amount treated as income under any provision of this Ordinance” were added to the definition. With the addition of these words in the term ‘income’, we cannot help concluding that the legislature would deem any amount to be income if it has been treated as such under any provision of the 2001 Ordinance. It does not matter whether the amount so treated is tangible income in the form of cash or money or rather notional or deemed income. If the legislature treats a certain amount as income then it must be held to be income for the purposes of chargeability of tax. This is precisely what Section 7E has done by treating an income to be the notional income of a taxpayer at a certain time. We may clarify however that the notional income is not such that it is incapable of being realised at a future time and in fact the premise of taxation under Section 7E is that in the foreseeable future that notional income would be converted into real tangible income in the hands of the taxpayer. Section 7E presumes that a resident person has certain capital assets situated in Pakistan which though do not generate any income chargeable to tax but may be so charged to a notional income which the resident person shall be treated to have derived. The measure of tax is an amount equal to 5% of the fair market value of capital assets situated in Pakistan. Thus, we have no doubt in our mind that Entry 47 applies to the provisions of Section 7E and is a tax on income duly covered by the term as defined in section 2(29) of the 2001 Ordinance. The legislature has treated deemed/ notional income of a taxpayer holding a capital asset situated in Pakistan as a category of income and so the taxpayers cannot turn around and say that he cannot be taxed on such income being ultra vires. If this were the case, the petitioners before the learned Single Judge ought to have challenged the words inserted by Finance Act, 2003 by which the notion of deemed income was introduced in the 2001 Ordinance.

The case of Elahi Cotton:

29. We will now advert our attention to the watershed case of Elahi Cotton which was the subject of discussion by both the learned counsel for the appellants and the respondents and each one of them attempted to draw an inference to suit his own case.

30. Elahi Cotton squarely related to presumptive tax on income and the question dilated by a powerful Bench of the Supreme Court of Pakistan was whether deemed income could be made part of the term ‘income’ and taxed accordingly. The distilled essence of the precedents considered in Elahi Cotton as well as the concepts regarding the term ‘income’ were encapsulated in paragraph 31 of the judgment and the learned counsel for the appellants have relied upon this paragraph in support of their arguments. But, priorly, the provisions of section 80D of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 (which was amongst others considered by the Supreme Court) may be set out below in order to bring home the similarity in the concept permeating the two provisions:

80D. Minimum tax on income of certain companies and registered firm—(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Ordinance or any other law for the time being in force, where no tax is payable or paid by a company or a registered firm resident in Pakistan or the tax payable or paid is less than one-half per cent of the amount representing its turnover from all sources, the aggregate of the declared turnover shall be deemed to be income of the said company or a registered firm and tax thereon shall be charged in the manner specified in Sub-section (2).

(2) The company or a registered firm referred to in Sub-section (1) shall pay as income tax:

(a) an amount, where no tax is payable or paid equal to one-half per cent of the said turnover; and

(b) an amount, where tax payable or paid is less than one-half per cernt of the said turnover, equal to the difference between the tax payable or paid and the amount calculated in accordance with clause (a).”

31. The impost levied through section 80D above is, doubtless, on deemed income. Apart from the measure of tax, there is no difference in the incidence of tax and the underlying intention to levy tax on deemed income. For the purposes of the present appeals, the following observations made in Elahi Cotton are relevant and are set out below:

“(ix) That the law should be saved rather than be destroyed and the Court must lean in favour of upholding the constitutionality of a legislation keeping in view that the rule of Constitutional interpretation is that there is a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of the legislative enactments unless ex facie it is violative of a Constitutional provision.

(x) That as per dictionary the word 'income' means "a thing that comes in ". Its natural meaning embraces any profit or gain which is actually received. However, while construing the above word used in an entry in a legislative list, the above restricted meaning cannot be applied keeping in view that the allocation of the subjects to the lists is not by way of scientific or logical definition but by way of mere simplex enumeration of broad categories.

(xi) That the expression "income" includes not merely what is received or what comes in by exploiting the use of a property but also what one saves by using it oneself. For example, use of a house by its owner.

(xii) That what is not "income" under the Income Tax Act can be made "income" by a Finance Act. An exemption granted by the Income Tax Act can be withdrawn by the Finance Act or the efficacy of that exemption may be reduced by the imposition of a new charge, of course, subject to Constitutional limitations.

(xvii) That generally the effect of a deeming provision in a taxing statute is that it brings within the tax net an amount which ordinarily would not have been treated as an income. In other words, it brings within the net of chargeability income not actually accrued but which supposedly to have accrued notionally.

(xviii) That when a statute enacts that something shall be deemed to have been done which in fact and in truth was not done, the Court is entitled and bound to ascertain for what purposes and between what persons the statutory fiction is to be resorted to.

(xix) That where a person is deemed to be something the only meaning possible is that whereas he is not in reality that something, the Act required him to be treated as he were with all inevitable corollaries of that state of affairs.”

32. The Supreme Court in Elahi Cotton firstly alluded to the well established principle that a law must be saved rather than destroyed and courts must lean in favour of constitutionality of a legislation. Secondly, it was held that while construing the words in an Entry in the Legislative List restricted meaning cannot be applied keeping in view the rule that the allocation of the subjects to the lists is not by way of scientific or logical definition. Thirdly, that the expression ‘income’ includes not merely what is received or what comes in by exploiting the use of a property but also what one saves by using it oneself. Fourthly, the effect of deeming provision of a taxing statute was discussed and it was stated that a deeming provision brings within the tax net an amount which ordinarily would not have been treated as income. In short, it brings within the ambit of chargeability income not actually accrued but supposedly to have accrued notionally.

33. Further alluding to the term ‘income’ it was observed in Elahi Cotton “The word "income" is susceptible as to include not only what is in ordinary parlance it conveys or it is understood, but what is deemed to have arisen or accrued. It is also manifest that income-tax is not only levied in the conventional manner i.e., by working out the net income after adjusting admissible expenses and other items, but the same may also be levied on the basis of gross receipts, expenditure etc. There are new species of income tax, namely, presumptive tax and minimum tax.”

34. The above observations leave it in no manner of doubt that in Elahi Cotton the Supreme Court clearly held deemed income as part of the word ‘income’ used in Entry 47 of the Constitution and wide leeway has been given to the legislature to include notional income as income of a taxpayer and to impose tax accordingly. While so holding the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of section 80C and section 80D of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 which related to presumptive tax on deemed income. Our system of administration of justice is founded on the law of precedents and this also finds expression in Article 189 of the Constitution which clearly states that decisions of the Supreme Court are binding on other courts. The decision in Elahi Cotton decided a question of law and is based upon and enunciates a principle of law and is thus binding on this Court. It would be improper and erroneous on the part of this Court to ignore the clear ratio decidendi in Elahi Cotton as we do not find any distinction between what was decided in Elahi Cotton and the present appeals where a challenge has been laid to tax on deemed income and section 7E more particularly. When juxtaposed, we do not find any sunlight between the present cases and Elahi Cotton and the question of law decided therein applies on all fours to these cases. Any challenge to section 7E should have been thrown out on the basis that the concept of deemed income has been recognized and upheld by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in Elahi Cotton and nothing further remains to be decided.

35. Similar challenges were brought before the Sindh High Court and a Division Bench at Karachi proceeded to dismiss the petitions in inter alia C.P No.4614 of 2022. The Sindh High Court relied upon the judgment of Elahi Cotton and stated as follows:

“As to the argument that a tax has been levied without there being any transaction not resulting in any income, it would suffice that again the same does not appear to be a correct approach as apparently holding of property beyond the threshold as provided in Section 7E(2)(g) is by itself a transaction which has been deemed to be an income within the ambit of Section 7E ibid. Similarly, the argument that a transaction only occurs when an actual amount of income has been received is also misconceived as apparently a deemed income concept has been upheld by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Elahi Cotton case and we need not go any further to elaborate the said concept of deemed income which apparently is an income, notwithstanding that it is being received in terms of money or otherwise. It is a fictional income concept, and if at all, it is to be relatable to an actual transaction or an attempt to generate an income, as contended, it would then not be an income deemed to have arisen. Deemed income of a tax-payer is always not an actual income; hence, if the conditions of an enactment are satisfied, it is deemed income, irrespective of the actual transaction. This is what the concept of a deemed income is. Any other interpretation and meaning would not be a deemed income; but an actual income. A fictional income is not needed to create a situation which already exists in reality. It is an income which is deemed to have arisen and that is all. Once it is so, then any other relative happenings are materially irrelevant. The definition of income is an inclusive definition; it enlarges the meaning of income. An income from property which has been made liable to tax is not its actual income in money but an artificial or statutory income as explained in the impugned section 7E of the Ordinance. In fact, by way of insertion of this Section another head of income has been created; though fictionally. Therefore the fact that the owner of the property receives no income in fact or even that there is no possibility of his receiving an income is irrelevant for the consideration of the question as to what the artificial or statutory income of an assessee is from property.”

36. While on the subject, a reference may also be made to section 113 of 2001 Ordinance which is headed ‘minimum tax on the income of certain persons’. The provision applies to certain taxpayers who have declared loss for the years, are exempt from tax or after claiming of allowances or deductions, no tax is payable for the tax year. In such cases, by Sub-section (2), the aggregate of the persons’ turnover (as defined in Sub-section (3) shall be treated as the income of the person for the year chargeable to tax. Again the notion of deemed income has been applied to treat the turnover of a person, as income. In this manner, these categories of taxpayers are also made chargeable to tax by treating the amount of turnover as their income based upon the extended meaning given in section 2(29) of 2001 Ordinance. Sections 7E and 113belong to the same genre and such provisions are now woven into the fibre of our tax laws.

37. Learned counsel for the respondents relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan which is a three-members judgment and reported as Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation v. Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Finance (1992 SCMR 891) (PIDC case). This case came under discussion in Elahi Cotton and was distinguished. The observations made in PIDC case were not approved in Elahi Cotton which was decided by larger Bench of the Supreme Court of Pakistan in the following terms:

“As regards cases of Pakistani origin referred to hereinabove in para.29, it may be observed that the learned counsel for the appellants heavily relied upon the case of Government of Pakistan and others v. Muhammad Ashraf and others (supra) mentioned in sub-para. (viii) of para.29 hereinabove, the same has been again dealt with herein- below in para.44. Reliance was also placed by the learned counsel for the appellants on certain observations in the case of Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation v. Pakistan (supra) mentioned at para. 29(vii) hereinabove, particularly on the general observation that "thus the deeming provision in section 4 of the Act. By this provision anything which is not income cannot be treated as income Before charging tax an assessee must be shown to have received income or it has arisen and accrued or deemed to be so", (which has been referred to hereinabove in sub-para. (xxxiii) of para. 31).

The above observations no doubt seemingly support the learned counsel for the appellants, but the same are to be viewed with reference to the context in which they were made, namely, whether the definition of income as extended by newly-added section 2(6-C) of the late Act, whereby even free reserves exceeding paid-up ordinary share capital of the company as on the last day of the previous year, was included in the income. The above provisions were not declared ultra vires by this Court in the above report. Furthermore, the above general observation founded on traditional approach cannot be pressed into service to examine the Constitutional validity of the above three impugned sections.”

38. It can be seen that the observations made in PIDC case were not approved in Elahi Cotton and it was specifically stated that general observations founded on traditional approach could not be pressed into service to examine the Constitutional validity of three sections impugned in Elahi Cotton. In short, Elahi Cotton did not favour restrictive meaning of the term ‘income’ as used in Entry 47. The High Court of Sindh in the case referred to above, was also of the opinion that no reliance could be placed on PIDC case and that the holding in PIDC case had been disapproved by the Supreme Court in the later case of Elahi Cotton.

Error Regarding Source of Levy:

39. The controversy before the learned Single Judge turned on whether the levy was covered by Entry 47 or Entry 50.

40. Entry 50 was the subject matter of discussion in a number of appeals before a Division Bench of which one of us (Shahid Karim, J.) was a member and it was held that tax on capital value of immovable property was beyond the legislative competence of the Parliament and was within the power of the Provincial Assemblies to legislate upon. We will advert to this aspect and the holding of this Court in the later part of this judgment.

41. At the cost of repetition, it is reiterated that the allocation of the subjects to the lists is not by way of scientific or logical definition but by way of mere simple enumeration of broad categories. A single tax may derive its sanction from one or more entries and many taxes may emanate from one single entry. An entry in the Legislative List must be given a wide and liberal interpretation.

42. Entry 47 simply says that the legislature has the power to impose taxes on income other than agricultural income. The learned Addl. Attorney General is right when he contends that the words used would mean a wide array of different taxes which may be imposed on income and this is clearly discernible from reading of the Ordinance which indeed imposes taxes of different nature on the income of a person or different persons. It may be that the legislature chooses to impose a tax on certain set of persons and to grant exemption in respect of the other set of persons. By this mere categorization the tax will not be unconstitutional. Moreover, a person may be subjected to more than one taxes on his income to be caught by double taxation. In case the law permits clearly and without equivocation, such a tax would not be unlawful by the mere fact that it taxes the same income twice over. It has been said that “the power to tax twice is as ample as to tax once”. (Cited with approval in a number of U.S Supreme Court cases).

43. As stated earlier, the term ‘income’ has not been defined in the Constitution. The intention is clear and we do not harbour any doubt in this regard viz. that the framers of the Constitution intended the term to be elastic in the hands of the legislature to define it in whatever manner it deems appropriate in a given case. This is the very essence of Entry 47 and to attribute an intention to restrict or circumvent the powers of the legislature to define the term ‘income’ would be an unconstitutional argument.

44. For the purposes of these cases, the important words in the definition are “any amount treated as income under any provision of this Ordinance”. These words do not convey the meaning as proffered by the learned Single Judge to mean that the word “amount” used in this sentence would relate to a tangible and realisable amount and not an amount which is notional. This would be reading the word ‘amount’ separately and out of context with the entire sentence reproduced above. The sentence “any amount treated as income under any provision of this Ordinance” has to be read as a whole. Clearly, these words, when read as a whole, would convey ineluctably that the legislature may treat any amount as income and the use of word ‘treated’ is crucial and would connote an amount which may be deemed or imputed as income. Otherwise there was no logical basis for insertion of these words so as to confer power on the legislature to treat certain amounts as income. The purpose of these words cannot be defeated by a fantastic set of reasoning to achieve a desired result.

45. It may be noted that income tax is imposed for each tax year at the rate specified in different Divisions of Part I of the First Schedule on every person who has taxable income for the year (Sec. 4 of the Ordinance). Section 9 relates to the term ‘taxable income’ and provides that:

“9. Taxable income.- The taxable income of a person for a tax year shall be the total income under clause (a) of section 10 of the person for the year reduced (but not below zero) by the total of any deductible allowances under Part IX of this Chapter of the person for the year.”

46. Thus, taxable income as envisaged in the Ordinance would mean the total income of a person for the year reduced by the total of any deductible allowances. Section 10 of the Ordinance further defines the term ‘total income’ to mean a persons’ income under all heads of income for the year. The heads of income have been provided in section 11 and include salary, income from property, income from business, capital gains and income from other sources. These heads of income clearly relate to real and tangible income and so the legislature in including the words “any amount treated as income under any provision of this Ordinance’ was cognizant of what taxable income was and so proceeded to extend the meaning of the term ‘income’ to include deemed and notional income imputable to a taxpayer.

47. Notwithstanding the above and even if we were to ignore the definition of the word ‘income’ used in the Ordinance, section 7E refers to an amount which has been treated as income under the provisions of the Ordinance and the legislature has sought to do so under its powers conferred by Entry 47 which, to reiterate, does not give a restrictive and cloistered meaning to the term ‘income’. In our considered view, a resort to the definition of income as given in the dictionaries cannot be had since the term has already been defined in the Ordinance and section 7E clearly refers to tax on deemed income. In doing so, the legislature is imposing a tax on deemed income being fully aware of the sweep of the term ‘income’ as used in the Constitution to include deemed income.

Parliamentary Debates:

48. The learned counsel for the appellants also referred to the budget speech of 2022-23 by the Finance Minister who while placing before the National Assembly the budget proposals stated that:

“The major part of the wealth of rich people is parked in the real estate sector in Pakistan. This is a double-faceted menace. It leads to the accumulation of unproductive assets and raises the prices of housing for the poor and lower-income groups. We intend to correct this imbalance. Therefore, all persons who have more than one immovable property exceeding Rs.25 million situated in Pakistan shall be deemed to have received rent equal to 5% of the fair market value of the immovable property and shall pay tax at the rate of 1% of the fair market value of the said property. However, one house of each individual will be excluded.”

49. It is not unusual for the courts to rely upon Parliamentary debates as an extrinsic material to gauge the intention of the legislation. The milestone case in relation to looking beyond the legislative wording was Pepper v. Hart (1992) 65 TC 421 which opened up transcendent interpretative possibilities by allowing reference to parliamentary record to establish parliamentary intention while interpreting legislation which is ambiguous or obscure. The case of Pepper has been cited with approval by our superior courts which have also used the concept to analyse the parliamentary debates for reaching the true intention behind a legislative measure. Although in this case we do not find the legislation to be ambiguous or obscure, we have merely referred to the budget speech in order to establish that the impugned tax was directed at the wealth of rich people parked in real estate sector in Pakistan. This aspect of the matter is widely known and governments over the years have struggled to bring this sector within the tax net. Real estate sector in Pakistan which, in the opinion of the Finance Minister, is accumulation of unproductive assets raises the price of housing for the poor and lower income groups. It was under these circumstances that the persons who have more than one immovable properties exceeding worth 25 million and resident in Pakistan, will be deemed to have received income equal to 5% of the fair market value of the immovable property. In doing so, legislature was acutely aware that tax is very much a social and institutional practice and therefore proceeded to tax a social practice having significant ramifications.

Reading Down:

50. The learned Single Judge has employed the rule of reading down to recast the provisions of section 7E in an attempt to “save the legislation, within competence under Entry 50”. Thus, although the learned Single Judge was of the opinion that the tax was outwith the powers under Entry 47, it was nevertheless covered by Entry 50 and should be deemed as a tax on the capital value of assets within the meaning of Entry 50. By this method, the learned Single Judge in fact saved the levy under Section 7E. Since we have held that the tax is covered by Entry 47 and is a tax on income, though deemed, this portion of the impugned judgment falls to the wayside. We may however observe that the rule of reading down is rarely applied by the courts in Pakistan and in fact, in our opinion, is a rule to be disapplied for countries with a written constitution. It is a concept peculiar to the U.K administration of justice which does not have a written constitution and the courts have fallen back on the rule of reading down (or reading in) to save a statutory provision or to conform it with constitutional principles. What the learned Single Judge has in fact done is to resort to judicial legislation by deleting some words from section 7E and substituting the others. In conclusion, the learned Single Judge also impressed upon the legislature to harmonize section 7E with the spirit of “taxing capital value of assets” so that the assets could be valued as a whole and taxed inseparably. Once again this was in the nature of Advisory declaration. That is why we have failed to understand as to how the respondents have felt satisfied with the ultimate conclusion drawn in the impugned judgment. Suffice to say that the courts cannot use the device of reading down in order to re-write a statutory provision. There is no compulsion on the courts to save legislation and if it is beyond the legislative competence and is unconstitutional, it must be struck down and not saved.

Section 7E Section 37 of the 2001 Ordinance:

51. Mr. Shahbaz Butt, Advocate, representing some of the respondents drew a comparison between section 7E and section 37 of the Ordinance to assert that the taxpayers were being subjected to double taxation as these were taxes of same genus. This argument was not raised before the learned Single Judge and thus there is no obligation on us to consider it at the appellate stage. Yet, the argument is rebutted with the following observations:

• Section 7E concerns with tax on income whereas section 37 is a tax on capital gains.

• Income is either earned or deemed to be earned from various sources during the tax year regardless of sale or disposal of any asset whereas tax on capital gains is a tax on profits arising from eventual sale/ disposal of an asset.

52. It is the realization of gains from appreciation in the value of an asset and clearly if no gain arises from disposal of asset then no tax on capital gains is liable to be paid. In other words, while income tax is applied on the entire amount of the taxable income, capital gains is applied to the extent of gain in amount from a particular asset and not on the entire money received by the taxpayer from the disposal of asset. Sub-clause (2)(f) of section 7E provides that for a property on which tax under Section 236K (advance tax on purchase or transfer of immovable property) has been paid that taxation will be excluded from the ambit of section 7E for the first tax year of acquisition. Further, section 8 of the Ordinance provides that tax under Section 7E shall be a final tax on the amount in respect of which the tax is imposed.

53. Capital gain tax is imposed under Section 37 at the rates given in Division VIII of Part I of the First Schedule to the Ordinance and presupposes that i) the immovable property was purchased by the taxpayer, ii) sold by the taxpayer; iii) at a price higher than the purchase price resulting in capital gain, iv) sold within five years of its purchase. It is pertinent to mention that rate of capital gains tax on the holding period exceeding six years is zero per cent. Therefore, it is not guaranteed that the property will be sold at all and meet the conditions (i) to (iv) above so as to attract capital gains tax. Ms. Asma Hamid, Advocate who prepared a Note in this regard and from which we have had the benefit of making the distinctions above further supported her arguments with illustrations in order to underline the difference between incidence of tax under Section 7E and section 37 of the Ordinance:

i. “Assume that a Purchases a property in tax year 2002, which he later sells within that tax year for a higher price. A’s income is taxable under Section 37 as he incurred capital gains, however, it is not taxable under Section 7E because that property was not held on the last day of the tax year.

ii. Similarly, assume that A purchases a property in tax year 2022 for which withholding tax under Section 236K has been paid, and which he later sells for a higher price in tax year 2023. A is liable to pay tax under Section 37 at the prescribed rate as he incurred capital gains for tax year 2023. A is not liable to pay tax under Section 7E in respect of deemed income from this immovable property either in tax year 2022 (as per sub-clause 2(f) of Section 7E), and neither in tax year 2023 because the property was not held on the last day of the year 2023.

iii. Assume that A inherits a property in tax year 2022 and holds it till the last day of that tax year, A will be liable for tax under Section 7E as he is holding the property on the last day of the tax year 2022. However, A may not be liable to pay tax under Section 37 as there is no disposal of the property by A.

iv. Assume that A purchased a property in tax year 2022 for which tax under Section 236K has been paid, and sells the same at a higher price in tax year 2025. In this situation, A is liable to pay tax under Section 7E for tax year 2023 and tax year 2024. The gain earned by A is also liable to be taxed under Section 37 in tax year 2025.

54. It is clear from the above illustrations that the incidence of tax in respect of both sections 7E and 37 of the Ordinance are distinct and separate and are triggered under different circumstances. There is no duplication in the imposition of taxes under Section 7E and 37 and the question of double taxation does not arise.

Exemptions and Discrimination :

55. Sub-section (2) of section 7E excludes certain capital assets from the ambit of tax under Section 7E.

We are here concerned with the following capital assets which were declared to be unconstitutional by the learned Single Judge on the ground that Article 25 of the Constitution did not permit such classification to be made. Clause (d) of Sub-section (2) of section 7E provides that:

(d) capital asset allotted to -

(i) a Shaheed or dependents of a shaheed belonging to Pakistan Armed Forces;

(ii) a person or dependents of the person who dies while in the service of Pakistan armed forces or Federal or provincial government;

(iii) a war wounded person while in service of Pakistan armed forces or Federal or provincial government; and

(iv) an ex-serviceman and serving personal of armed forces or ex-employees or serving personnel of Federal and provincial governments, being original allottees of the capital asset duly certified by the allotment authority;

56. The capital assets enumerated above have been excluded from taxation under Section 7E but in the impugned judgment this exclusion was held to be unconstitutional. The learned Single Judge relied upon the well-worn test regarding discriminatory legislation as vouched by respectable authority and the superior courts have relied upon it in a number of precedents. These principles have also been reiterated in Elahi Cotton Mills where it was stated that persons similarly situated are to be treated alike and if there is a reasonable classification to be made, it must be founded on intelligible criteria having rational nexus to the objectives sought to be achieved by such classification.

57. The classification which was made in section 7E is in respect of capital assets allotted to certain persons which include Shaheeds of Pakistan Armed Forces or their dependents, persons who died while in the service of Pakistan Armed Forces or Federal or Provincial Government etc. It must be borne in mind that the exclusion is in respect of capital asset and not in respect of persons and strictly therefore the provisions of Article 25 are not attracted. If the rule applied by learned Single Judge were to hold sway, the entire Sub-section (2) should have been struck down being discriminatory and not merely clause (d) of Sub-section (2).

58. Notwithstanding the above, we do not find clause (d)(i to iv) to be suffering from vice of discriminatory legislation which could be held to offend Article 25 of the Constitution. Sub-section (2) (d)(i to iv) indeed carves out categories of persons which are distinct and apart from general category of taxpayers. There is no cavil that the legislature is indeed empowered to create categories of taxpayers and to tax one and not other. The only rule which constrains that power has been set out above. We do not find the categories so made to violate that rule.

59. Section 7E (2)(d)(i) has been held to be unconstitutional as in the opinion of the learned Single Judge, Shaheeds and dependents of police and other forces have been left out of this class who are similarly placed. Suffice to say that next paragraph (ii) has been held to be not discriminatory although that paragraph contemplates Shaheed and dependents of police and other forces. Therefore, the very basis of holding of (i) is erroneous. Similarly, section 7E (2)(d)(iii) has also been held to be unconstitutional and the learned Single Judge has equated this category with a labourer who also should be compensated for a wound or being disabled. We will reiterate that this category relates to person in the service of Pakistan Armed Forces or Federal or Provincial Government who are wounded in times of war. Certainly, a labourer will not be employed at the time of war and it will only be the persons in service of Pakistan Armed Forces and other security forces attached with Federal or Provincial Government. Thus, in our opinion, it creates a distinct category which is not discriminatory at all. Lastly, section 7E (2)(d)(i) is also a category apart and relates to ex-service men and service personnel of armed forces or serving personnel of Federal and Provincial Governments who are original allottees of a capital asset duly certified by the allotment authority. Once again, this category cannot be equated with persons generally who have purchased capital assets from their own earning. The category relates to salaried class in the service of Federal and Provincial Government who have limited means and are allotted a capital asset during the tenure of their service. They have limited financial means to acquire an asset otherwise and should not be burdened with the imposition of tax under Section 7E. This portion of the impugned judgment contained in paragraph 25 is also set aside having been issued on an erroneous view of law.

60. Before we tear ourselves away, it is indeed incredulous to note that the respondents chose not to challenge the Impugned Judgment which has, in actual fact, upheld the levy by saving it under Entry 50. This was done by reading down. The respondents were not spared the taxation under Section 7E.

61. In conclusion, we allow the appeals (Appendix-I attached with this judgment). The Impugned Judgment is set aside.

62. The Appeals at Appendix-II (attached with this judgment) have been filed by the appellants (petitioners before the Single Bench) on the ground that the relief granted by the learned Single Judge is materially opposed to what was sought in the constitutional petitions. We allow these appeals on the same basis as above. But, in the same vein, the respective constitutional petitions brought by these appellants will be dismissed for the reasons enumerated above.


Sd/-
(SHAHID KARIM)
JUDGE

Sd/-
(RASAAL HASAN SYED)
JUDGE

APPENDIX-II