The Federal Government through S.R.O. No.506(I)/95, dated 14th June, 1995 exempted raw material and components which were not manufactured locally and were specified in column (3) of the Table annexed to S.R.O. if these were imported by the manufacturers of the goods specified in column (2) of the said Table from so much of the customs duty as was in excess of the rates specified in column (5) thereof. The notification which was made subject to as many as eight conditions was to remain in force till 30th June, 1996.

2. The appellant is a manufacturer of footwear and operates a customs bonded warehouse within, the factory. He imported P. V. C. resin and in-bonded them. He filed various ex-bond bill of entries between 12th and 27th of June, 1996 for the removal of PVC from the bonded warehouse for use in the manufacture of footwear. His claim of exemption from duty in excess of 10% ad-valorem in accordance with the aforesaid notification was denied on the ground that the said notification having been rescinded by S.R.O. No.447(I)/96, dated 13-6-1996 the exemption from levy of duty' in excess of 10% was no more available to him.

3. The issues of incorrect rate of exchange applied to the imported goods, the claim of concession available to him under the rescinded notification and the imposition. of regulatory duty at the rate of 10% as found against him in the order in original were challenged before the Tribunal. The Tribunal by way of the impugned order, dated 8-1-1998 maintained the order in original with regard to determination of value of the subject goods. Also that exemption claimed in the aforesaid S.R.O., dated 14-6-1995 was no more available to him. However, the issue of regulatory duty was found in his favour.

4. Since the issue of determination of value was not seriously contested before the Tribunal and since the departmental appeal (C .A. No.18/98) against the relief allowed with regard to regulatory duty already stands allowed; both issues are no more alive. It .is only the availability of concessionary S.R.O., dated 14-6-1995 which remains the moot point in this further appeal under section 196 of the Customs Act, 1969.

5. Heard the learned counsel for the parties. Learned counsel for the appellant relies upon re: Messrs M.Y. Electronics Industries (Pvt.) v. Government of Pakistan (1998 SCMR 1404) and re: Messrs Alhamd Textile Mills Ltd. v. Pakistan (2001 SCMR 556) to contend that the provisions of section 31-A are of restricted application in cases of concessionary notifications in which the period of concession has been specified.

6. Learned counsel for the Revenue, however, relies upon re: Messrs Gadoon Textile Mills v. WAPDA and others (1997 SCMR 641). Also refers to a recent judgment, dated 15-8-2001 recorded by a learned Judge in Chamber in Writ Petition No.2139 of. 1996 re: Best Way Cement Limited v. Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad.

7. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, we arms persuaded to agree with the learned counsel for the appellant that a concession allowed till a specific date cannot be withdrawn unilaterally by the revenue or for that matter the Federal Government at its. whims, The mention of an express date to dole out a concession does create a vested right in favour of a person who had acted upon the promise so held out by the Government or the Revenue. The authority of the Federal Government or the Revenue to withdraw- a concessionary notification is certainly not debateable. However, when such a concession. is given till a certain point of time then in absence of compelling circumstances which may include national interest or a drastic change in national economy or force majeure which could not be foreseen at the time of granting concession it cannot be withdrawn. In the case in hand the concessionary notification issued for one year was unilaterally withdrawn only 17 days before the expiry date, namely 30-6-1996. There is nothing on record to show that withdrawal of concession was necessitated, in the national interest' or for the protection of national economy. The withdrawal of concession only some days before the specific date had to be justified on the touchstone of the said exigencies. However, no reason whatsoever appears to have been given in that regard. The discretion vested in the Federal Government or the Revenue to grant a concession and to withdraw it cannot be equated. While to allow a concession is discretionary, its abrupt and unilateral withdrawal is not so.

8. In a civilized and democratic society the people have all the justification in the world to expect maturity on the part of their fiscal planners. Obviously when a concession is contemplated and mused upon at the relevant level, all pros and cons are discussed, foreseen and debated: Once it is done then, as noted earlier, unless something unforeseeable happens and force majeure interferes an abrupt withdrawal of that decision to extend concession cannot be approved. The Revenue or the Federal Government cannot be allowed to act as an immature prince who may grant pardon for treason but execute a subject for a small discourtesy.

9. Obviously it is all the more correct with regard to a concession which is held out to the subject for a specific period. At the time or considering such a concession the Revenue must have kept in mind its present as well as future policies with regard to the specific kind or goods or incomes. As said above a case for exercise of jurisdiction to withdraw a concession can certainly be made out but not without explaining the unforeseen events intervening before the expiry of the date of validity of concession. A person, who had acted upon the promise extended by the State represented through the Revenue cannot be allowed to be taken by surprise unless unexceptionable reasons exist therefor. In a number of recent judgments we have observed that a citizen as an assessee is not an adversery who should always be under observation to be attacked whenever found negligent or lacking in tactic. A citizen as an assessee cannot be treated as an enemy whose simple fault should be exploited to the extreme so devastate him.

10. As observed earlier, since no justifiable reason for withdrawal of the concessionary notification only 17 days before the date of expiry has been brought home, we disapprove the exercise of discretion by the Federal Government in rescinding the notification. The defence taken up by the learned counsel for the Revenue hardly finds any support from the aforesaid judgments of the Supreme Court of Pakistan as well as the findings recorded by our learned brother Muhammad Nawaz Abbasi, J. in the said Constitutional petition. There is nothing in the two judgments which allow unrestricted discretion to the Federal Government or the Revenue to withdraw a concession whose life was fixed by themselves. That life they choose to take just for the fun of it. At the cost of repetition we would like to emphasise that no one has a right to a concession. However, when it is allowed for a specific time through a statute or statutory instruments it can be withdrawn only in exceptional conditions which are justiciable and open to judicial review.

9. Therefore, this appeal is allowed and the appellant is held to be entitled to the benefits of concessionary notification in respect of bills of entry filed before the expiry date mentioned in the original notification.

SD/-
NASIM SIKANDAR
JUSTICE

SD/-
MUHAMMAD SAIR ALI
JUSTICE